Media platforms face the choice between lump-sum and proportional fees when they charge advertisers. This paper builds a two-stage dynamic game model to solve an endogenous choice problem with regard to the advertising pricing instruments of two media platforms. If either the proportional fee or the lump-sum fee is feasible, the dominant strategy for both platforms is to charge advertisers a proportional fee. This explains why online media platforms prefer to charge advertisers the proportional fee. We also examine the asymmetric pricing between two platforms that adopt different advertising schemes, which sheds light on the competition between online media and traditional media.
contract restrictions. Hence, they can only charge advertisers a lump-sum fee 1 . Since the online media platforms and the traditional media firms usually coexist in the same media market and face similar targeted consumers, how do these two types of media platforms that adopt different price instruments influence each otherʼs prices and market shares? As empirically shown by Evans (2009) , traditional media firms represented by newspapers are losing readers and advertisers to online media.
The above-mentioned questions motivate us to study how the pricing structure to advertisers affects the price competition among platforms, and to explore the platformʼs strategic choice of advertising fee. Specifically, this paper solves an endogenous choice problem with regard to the advertising pricing instruments of two platforms, provided that they both charge consumers a lump-sum fee. In the context of price competition with single-homing agents on both sides, we consider a two-stage game in which each platform decides whether to charge advertisers a lump-sum fee or a proportional fee in the first stage, and sets the prices to maximize their profits in the second stage. We find that in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, choosing to charge advertisers a proportional fee is the dominant strategy for both platforms. Hence, if both charging advertisers a proportional fee and a lump-sum fee are available to online platforms, they will choose the proportional fee. The economic intuition is as follows: switching from a lump-sum fee to a proportional fee affects both marginal and infra-marginal effects on the benefits from the consumers to the platform. On the one hand, the marginal benefit from an extra consumer is shared between the platform and the advertisers through the proportional fee. This implies that the benefit of an extra consumer on the marginal advertiser becomes lower, thereby reducing the number of new comers of advertiser. As a result, the marginal benefits from an additional consumer to the platform decline. On the other hand, this loss of marginal benefits is partly offset by a gain in the infra-marginal effect from the consumers to the platform. That is because the participation of an extra consumer enables the platform to extract from all of its advertisers an additional proportional fee. However, the loss of marginal effects outweigh the gain in the infra-marginal effects in equilibrium, so the total benefits brought by each consumer are reduced. This shows that, if they charge advertisers a proportional fee, the price competition between the platforms is weaker and the platforms make more profits. The above analysis explains the first question mentioned in the first paragraph.
Since choosing the proportional fee is always a dominant strategy for the media platform, when we consider the market where both the traditional media platforms and the online media platforms coexist, we can conclude that the online media platforms prefer to charge the advertisers the proportional fee. Nevertheless, to the traditional media platforms, only charging a lump-sum fee is available. To address the second question, we also investigate the asymmetric case when one platform (the traditional media platform) charges advertisers a lumpsum fee while the other (the online media platform) charges a proportional fee. We find that the online platform enjoys an advantage over the traditional platform in the market shares of both consumers and advertisers. This result theoretically verifies the empirical finding of Evans (2009) . Furthermore, which platform charges each advertiser a higher price depends on the comparison of externalities. If the externality of consumers is higher than that of advertisers, the rival platform will utilize its market share advantage of consumers to exploit advertisers with a higher price. These findings provide answers to the second question mentioned in the beginning.
The present paper relates to two strands of literature. First, it builds upon the works on the pricing behavior of firms in two-sided markets. Caillaud and Jullien (2003) analyze the case of non-differentiated platforms that provide pure intermediation service to homogenous users and charge both a lump-sum fee and a proportional fee, arguing that proportional fees act as a form of risk sharing between the platform and the agents. However, they do not consider the case when consumers are heterogeneous in their preferences, which is prevalent in the media market. Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Armstrong (2006) investigate the pricing behavior of two-sided platforms with heterogeneous consumers. The former focuses on the case of pure usage (proportional) fees and provide the classical argument on two-sided markets that one groupʼs agents may subsidize the other group, while the latter places an emphasis on lump-sum fees. Following these two works, Gabszewicz et al. (2001) , Crampes et al. (2009), and Reisinger (2011) assume that the advertisers are charged a lump-sum fee in their analysis on the media market, while Anderson and Coate (2005) and Peitz and Valletti (2008) assume that media platforms impose a proportional fee on advertisers. However, these works mainly assume one type of fee structure as exogenously given without looking into the effects of varying the price instruments. Rochet and Tirole (2006) build a canonical monopoly model that considers both a lump-sum fee and a proportional fee and obtain that the optimal pricing obeys the Lerner formula in both pricing regimes. However, they do not introduce the competition among platforms. In general, the above literature provides pioneering analyses of the properties of twosided markets, but does not consider the impacts of different pricing structures in the context of oligopolistic competition and heterogeneous agents. The present paper contributes to the first strand of literature by filling this research gap.
Second, this paper is also linked to a few works that compare the impacts of different pricing regimes on two-sided media markets. Dietl et al. (2013) compare the profit and welfare effects of a lump-sum fee versus a proportional fee to advertisers based on the competition between an ad-free (one-sided) pay media platform and a free media platform with advertisements, showing that the free (pay) media platform generates higher (lower) profits when the free media platform adopts a lump-sum fee than when it charges a proportional fee to advertisers. However, they do not consider a more general framework in which both platforms are two-sided and charge both sides a fee. In general, they still take different price instruments as exogenously given and compare them separately.
2 This paper extends this strand of literature by endogenizing the choices on advertising pricing, and our results provide a new perspective of understanding the pricing behaviors of media platform.
Complementary to the above literature, this paper investigates media platformsʼ endogenous choice on different price instruments in an oligopolistic market with heterogeneous agents. In particular, the present paper is related to the single-homing two-part tariff model in Armstrong (2006) . Both Armstrong (2006) and the present paper share the framework of a single-homing duopoly, and both consider the endogenous choice over price instruments. However, this paper deviates from that paper in three respects. First, it differs with respect to the adoption of price instruments. Armstrong (2006) assumes that both platforms charge a twopart tariff consisting of both lump-sum fees and proportional fees, while this paper considers a binary choice model in which platforms choose between a lump-sum fee and a proportional fee to advertisers and charge consumers a subscription (lump-sum) fee. Second, this paper is distinct in terms of the timing of the game. Armstrong (2006) provides a one-shot game in which platforms decide on the price instruments and prices simultaneously. However, media platforms may first choose the price instruments, which are more difficult to adjust, and then set the optimal prices, as considered in this paper. Third, Armstrong (2006) analyzes the symmetric case when both platforms adopt the same pricing structure, but we also discuss the asymmetric case when platforms adopt different price instruments here.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, we establish the duopoly model with two single-homing groups. In Section III, we derive the optimal prices and profits of the platforms regarding different price instruments to advertisers in the second stage, and obtain the optimal decision on the pricing to advertisers in the first stage. In Section IV, we discuss the prices, market shares and profits when a platform charges advertisers a lump-sum fee because it is too costly to adopt proportional charge, while the rival platform charges advertisers a proportional fee. Section V concludes.
II. The Model
Suppose there are two groups of agents, consumers and advertisers, who are connected by two competing platforms, A and B. Group 1 and group 2 represent consumers and advertisers, respectively. Each consumer and advertiser choose to register on a single platform. The assumption that both groups single-home is widely employed in existing literature on twosided markets, such as Belleflamme and Toulemonde (2009) and Kotsogiannis and Serfes (2010) . The reasons for both groups to single-home include the strong differentiation of the platform and limited resources of the agents. For instance, several empirical works on the media market, such as Kaiser and Wright (2006) and Argentesi and Filistrucchi (2007) , show that few firms advertise on more than one newspaper or magazine at the same time.
3 Groups 1 and 2 obtain utilities of u i 1 and u i 2, respectively, if they join platform i, where i=A, B . The utility of one group consists of the intrinsic value of the platform and the external benefits brought by the other group. A consumer obtains an intrinsic benefit of v1 by joining either platform, and an advertiser obtains an intrinsic value of v2 . In addition, both consumers and advertisers care about the number of agents in the other group on the same platform. α1 measures the benefit a consumer brings to each advertiser, and α2 measures the benefit a consumer enjoys from each advertiser on the same platform. Here we assume α1 and α2 are both positive to cover most cases in the media market. 4 To ensure full market coverage, we HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS [June 24 assume v1 and v2 are sufficiently large so that all consumers and advertisers participate.
Following the Hotelling specification, we assume the agents of each group are of mass one, and are uniformly distributed along a unit interval of [0, 1] . The two platforms are located at the two endpoints of the interval, with platform A located at 0 and platform B located at 1. A group-k agent incurs a disutility tkxk−l i  if he or she chooses platform i (i=A, B), where tk (k=1, 2) is the differentiation parameter for group k, and xk represents the type of the agent in group k. For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume t1=t2=1. To provide sharper results, we focus on the strength of cross-group externality relative to the differentiation parameter. Varying the differentiation parameter does not add more insight, but complicates the mathematics tremendously.
The two platforms charge consumers (group 1) a subscription (lump-sum) fee, and face a choice between a lump-sum charge and a proportional charge to advertisers (group 2). Specifically, platform i charges a subscription fee p 
With the Hotelling specification, the numbers of consumers and advertisers on platform i are respectively
Substituting expressions (3) and (4) into expressions (1) and (2), and using n i 1+n j 1=1 and n i 2+n j 2=1, yields the market shares of platform i in the consumer and advertiser groups:
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the annoyance. Here we concentrate on the case where the overall externality is positive, which is empirically supported by Kaiser and Wright (2006) .
where both platforms charge advertisers a lump-sum fee in regime I; both platforms charge advertisers a proportional fee in regime II; platform i (j) charges advertisers a lump-sum (proportional) fee in regime III; and platform i (j) charges advertisers a proportional (lump-sum fee) in regime IV. Without loss of generality, suppose both platforms incur zero constant cost to both groups. The profit of platform i is
proportional fee .
The two platforms behave in a Nash manner to maximize their profits. The game is comprised of two stages. In the first stage, the two platforms noncooperatively and simultaneously choose between lump-sum fees and proportional fees to advertisers. In the second stage, they determine the price levels to maximize their profits, having observed each otherʼs price instrument in the previous stage. We derive the adoption of price instruments in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium by using backward induction.
III. Competition in Price Instruments and Price Levels

Stage 2: Competition in Price Levels
This section discusses the optimal prices under different pricing schemes. To clarify our discussion, we consider the following three regimes: (I) both platforms charge advertisers a lump-sum fee; (II) both platforms charge advertisers a proportional fee; (III) platform A charges advertisers a lump-sum fee, whereas platform B charges advertisers a proportional fee. Here we do not analyze the case when platform B charges advertisers a lump-sum fee, while platform A charges advertisers a proportional fee (regime IV), since such a situation is symmetric to regime III, and all the results in regime IV can be easily derived from regime III. We make the following assumption to provide a meaningful solution:
This assumption provides a sufficient condition for the existence of a market-sharing equilibrium and positive prices in all regimes.
5 (See Appendix A) It highlights the situation when differentiation is stronger than the cross-group externality, on which this paper concentrates.
Denote p i kM as the lump-sum fee charged by platform i (i=A, B) to group k (k=1, 2) in regime M (M=I, II, III), and γ i 2N as the proportional fee charged by platform i (i=A, B) to group 2 in regime N (N=II, III). The equilibrium prices of both platforms are expressed in the following lemma:
Lemma 1: In equilibrium, the price levels of the platforms with different price instruments are HITOTSUBASHI JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS [June 26 as follows:
(1-i) When both platforms charge advertisers a lump-sum fee (regime I),
(1-ii) When both platforms charge advertisers a proportional fee (regime II), Proof: See Appendix B.
Q.E.D
To compare the prices intuitively, we first interpret the optimal prices in regimes I and II. We transform the prices in Lemma (1-i) and (1-ii) into:
Expressions (8) share the same features with Armstrong (2006) . In a standard Hotelling model without cross-group externalities, the equilibrium price to group j would be pjI=1, i.e. the differentiation factor. With cross-group externality, the price is adjusted downward by αj(pkI+αk), which measures the marginal external benefit to a platform when an additional group-j agent is attracted. First, an additional group-j agent on the platform attracts αj more group-k agents, as shown in expressions (5) and (6). Second, the profit that the platform can extract from each of these extra group-k agents is (pkI+αk), where pkI is the regular profit, and αk is the extra profit the platform can gain from group-j without losing market share. (When an extra group-k agent joins a platform, the utility of a group-j agent on that platform increases by αk, while the utility of a consumer on the rival platform decreases by αk. Hence the platform is able to increase the price to each group-j agent by 2αk without driving them away. Since the equilibrium number of group-j agents is 1 2 , the extra revenue it can extract from its group-j agents is αk.) Since αk is the revenue that a platform can extract from each group-k agent but is originally brought by an extra group-k agent, it can be regarded as a feedback effect of group k.
Compared with the benchmark of expressions (8), expressions (9) shed some new light. In particular, the price to consumers differs in two respects. First, the price is adjusted downward by (α1−γ2II)( 1 2 γ2II+α2) . As shown in expressions (6), an additional consumer on the platform attracts α1−γ2II more group-2 agents. Because the platform is able to charge a price of γ2II when a consumer views or clicks on an advertisement, the net benefit from a consumer decreases by γ2II. Hence the marginal attraction of advertisers falls by γ2II in comparison with regime I. In addition, similar to the interpretation in regime I, the profit that the platform can extract from each of these extra advertisers is 1 2 γ2II+α2 .
( 1 2 γ2II is the proportional fee γ2II multiplied by the equilibrium number of consumers 1 2 .) Hence the marginal effect of each consumer is reduced by γ2II(
The second adjustment factor missing in regime I is n2IIγ2II. An extra consumer brings not only marginal external benefits, as explained earlier, but also infra-marginal external benefits to the platform. From the utility function of group-2 agents, an additional consumer brings a utility of α1 to each advertiser, from which the platform is able to extract γ2II . Since the equilibrium number of advertisers present on the platform is 1 2 , the platform can extract a total profit of n2IIγ2II= 1 2 γ2II from the advertisers because of this additional consumer. Thus n2IIγ2II=1−α2 represents the infra-marginal external benefit to a platform from an additional consumer.
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[JuneNow we compare whether the reduction of marginal benefit or the positive infra-marginal benefit is stronger. Subtracting the infra-marginal effect by the marginal effect yields the net effect, which is −γ2II( 1 2 γ2II− 1 2 +α2) . The net effect is negative when γ2II>1−2α2, which is always true in equilibrium. That means the reduction in the marginal benefit of each consumer is only partly offset by its infra-marginal benefit. To be precise, the total benefit brought by each consumer to the advertisers decreases by 1−α2 in regime II. Therefore, the price to consumers is higher in regime II than in regime I, and the competition for consumers between the platforms is mitigated. Compared with regime I, the feedback effect of advertisers in regime II is also more complicated. q i 2II is constituted by the differentiation factor and the marginal external benefit from an additional advertiser. The first factor is the same as the standard Hotelling model. The second factor is also the number of consumers attracted by an additional advertiser (α2 from equations (5)) multiplied by the extra benefit from each of the attracted consumers
With an extra consumer, an advertiser on the platform enjoys a net utility gain of α1−γ i 2II because he or she is charged a proportional fee γ i 2II, while the utility of each advertiser on the rival platform falls by α1. Thus, the platform is able to increase the price to all the advertisers by 2α1−γ i 2II without losing any market share. Taking the equilibrium number of advertisers into account, the extra revenue from the advertisers because of an additional consumer is 1
. Therefore, the total effect to group 2 in regime II is the same as that in regime I, and hence the prices to advertisers in the two regimes are equal.
The price to consumers in regime III is between the prices in regimes I and II because the marginal benefit brought by a consumer in this regime is also in between. In addition, if the externality from a consumer is higher than that from an advertiser (α1>α2), platform B would extract more surplus from advertisers by charging a higher fee, while platform A would adopt the opposite strategy. The similar intuition also applies to the opposite case when the externality from a consumer is lower than that from an advertiser (α1<α2).
Stage 1: Choice on Price Instruments
This section derives the optimal choice on price instruments for the two platforms. π i M (M=I, II, III) represents the profit of platform i in regime M. Based on Lemma 1, we obtain the maximized profits of the platforms in each type of pricing structure, as summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 2: The maximized profits under different pricing structures are as follows: (2-i) When both platforms charge advertisers a lump-sum fee (regime I),
(2-ii) When both platforms charge advertisers a proportional fee (regime II), (2-iii) When platform A charges advertisers a lump-sum fee, and platform B charges advertisers a proportional fee (regime III),
where n i kIII (i=A, B and k=1, 2) represents the number of group-k agent on platform i in regime III. (For a detailed result in terms of the exogenous parameters, please see Appendix C.) Proof: Since both platforms gain an even market share of both groups in the symmetric equilibrium, we can easily derive the profits for case (2-i) and case (2-ii) by substituting the equilibrium prices obtained in lemma 1 and the equilibrium numbers of agents into expressions (7). The proof for the profits in case (2-iii) is in Appendix C.
Q.E.D Table 1 shows the profit matrix in the first stage, in which π i mn is given by (2-i) to (2-iii). Now we summarize the result in the following proposition.
Proposition 2: (i) Charging advertisers a proportional fee is a dominant strategy; (ii) Platforms make strictly more profits when they charge advertisers a proportional fee (π Proof: See Appendix D.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 reveals that it is always more profitable for either platform to adopt the proportional advertising price no matter what pricing structure the rival platform chooses. That is because the proportional advertising fee reduces the marginal benefit of consumers and subsequently weakens competition. By charging advertisers a proportional fee, the platform induces the rival to charge consumers a higher fee, whether the rival charges advertisers a lump-sum fee or a proportional fee, as shown in the first statement of Proposition 1. If the rival charges advertisers a lump-sum fee, the platform is able to encroach some of the rivalʼs market share and make more profit. If the rival also charges advertisers a proportional fee, the platform shares both markets equally with the rival but is able to set a higher price to consumers and subsequently gains more profit. In addition, when platforms adopting different price instruments coexist, the platform charging advertisers a lump-sum fee makes less profit than the one imposing a proportional fee. 
IV. Discussion
So far we have assumed that the platforms can freely switch between lump-sum fee and proportional fee. As indicated by Proposition 2, charging advertisers a proportional fee is always a dominant strategy for the media platform. However, it is not feasible for some media firms to adopt proportional advertising fee. Traditional media firms, such as newspapers and magazines, find it difficult to adjust advertising fees in accordance to the fluctuating circulation because of contract restrictions. At the same time, online media firms are able to charge advertisers proportionally on a cost-per-click or cost-per-thousand-view basis. Therefore, the coexistence of two types of platforms that adopt different price instruments prevails, and it is worth comparing the prices and market shares between these platforms in this asymmetric setting. (i.e., regime III: the (lump-sum fee, proportional fee) case in Table 1) We establish the result in the following proposition.
Proposition 3
In regime III, platform A charges a higher consumer fee than platform B and a higher (lower) advertising fee if α1<α2(α1>α2), but has lower market shares than platform B in both markets. That is,
Proof: See Appendix E.
Q.E.D.
The intuition can be roughly explained as follows. The equilibrium (at stage 2) in regime III is characterized by the system of first order conditions:
Comparing equations (10) and (11), we observe an extra negative effect of a rise in p B 1 on platform Bʼs profit, as expressed in the last term of equation (11). This effect is the inframarginal effect on the revenue from advertisers due to the fall in the number of consumers. Therefore, accounting for this extra effect, platform B sets a lower price to consumers than platform A.
The intuition for the platformsʼ prices to group B is as follows. We first derive the partial derivatives: ∂n
, and . Substituting these partial derivatives into equations (12) and (13) yields a clearer comparison of the factors that influence the two platformsʼ pricing decision:
Comparing equations (14) and (15), we can observe that platform B has to take one more effect into account. Raising γ B 2 by a marginal unit, platform B suffers from an extra inframarginal loss stemming from the reduction of consumers, as characterized by the last term in equation (13). If α2 is relatively large, this potential loss (gain) from a higher (lower) γ B 2 is relatively strong, and platform B consequently has more incentive to charge a lower price to advertisers. Precisely, platform B would charge a lower price if α2>α1.
The intuition for the comparison of market shares is straightforward. If platform B charges a lower price than platform A in both markets, it must enjoy a larger share of consumers and advertisers. If platform B charges advertisers a higher price than platform A, it would not raise the price too high to lose the market share of advertisers because this strategy would further exert a negative impact on consumersʼ demand.
As indicated by Proposition 3, when the two platforms adopt different price instruments, the platform charging a proportional advertising fee gains advantages in its market shares of both groups, while which platform charges advertisers a higher price depends on the comparison of the two groupsʼ externalities. This finding provides some theoretical implications to the media market, which is embodied with the coexistence of the traditional media firms that charge advertisers a lump-sum fee and the online media firms that charge advertisers proportional fees. Traditional media firms, such as city newspapers and magazines, mostly charge advertisers a lump-sum fee due to the difficulty to adjust prices in accordance to the fluctuating number of readers timely, but online media firms are able to employ the cost-perclick technology to levy flexible fees. Due to this distinction of pricing strategies, online media platforms are able to lower their prices to the readers so as to gain more shares in both markets. In reality, the encroachment of online media to traditional media is evident (Evans, 2009) . The different pricing structures between these two types of firms may provide part of the explanation. Moreover, if advertisers care more about the readers or the audience than the other way round (α1>α2), the traditional media platforms have to charge advertisers a lower price than the online media ones, as indicated by the proposition.
V. Conclusion
In reality, different media platforms adopt different price instruments when they charge advertisers. Existing literature mostly assumes either a lump-sum fee or a proportional fee, but overlooks platformsʼ endogenous choice on these two price instruments. This paper compares the optimal prices and profits under these two price instruments and solves an endogenous choice problem with regard to the advertising pricing instruments of two platforms competing for single-homing consumers and advertisers. In the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the dominant strategy is to adopt a proportional advertising fee, which explains why online media platforms prefer to charge advertisers a proportional fee. This paper also sheds light on the price competition between traditional media and online media, showing that the platform adopting a proportional advertising fee enjoys an advantage over the platform adopting a lumpsum advertising fee in terms of both market shares and profits. Besides, in this case, which platform charges each advertiser a higher price depends on the comparison of externalities. If the externality of consumers is higher than that of advertisers, the rival platform will utilize its market share advantage of consumers to exploit advertisers with a higher price.
The present paper is restricted to the case when both groups single-home. However, in reality, some groups may multi-home. For instance, consumers may read news from more than one platform. Therefore, a possible extension is to investigate the endogenous choice of price instruments when at least one group multi-homes. Another possible extension is to investigate the case when the externality of one group is negative, which may be complementary to the analysis of this paper. In sum, the present paper is just attempt to cast light on the pricing instruments choices among media firm.
APPENDIX
A: Proof of Lemma 1 and Assumption
Proof of Lemma 1-(i):
Solving the simultaneous equations (3) yields the market shares in terms of prices:
Platform i decides on the prices to the two groups in order to maximize its profits:
The sufficient and necessary condition for a market-sharing equilibrium to exist is the second order condition of the platformʼs profit should be negative, i.e. J= To ensure that a market-sharing equilibrium exists, the sufficient and necessary condition is:
which ensures that:
which implies that the differentiation parameters (1, 1) should be larger than the network externality parameters (α1, α2).
For the case of a symmetric equilibrium, each platform offers the same set of prices at:
2H .
where
The sufficient and necessary condition for a market-sharing equilibrium to exist is the second order condition of the platformʼs profit should be negative, i.e.J=  π11 π12 π21 π22 should be negative definite, where
Here J= 1 8
J is negative definite if and only if:
To ensure the existence of a market-sharing equilibrium, the necessary and sufficient condition is:
Given the condition for the existence of a market-sharing equilibrium, we have:
(A-5)
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Proof of Lemma 1-(iii) Solving the simultaneous equations (3) yields the market shares in terms of prices:
,
where I=2(1−α1α2)+α2γ B 2 . Platforms A and B decide on the prices to the two groups in order to maximize their profits:
The equilibrium prices are characterized by:
=0.
The sufficient and necessary condition for a market-sharing equilibrium to exist is the second order condition of the platformsʼ profit should be negative, i.e. which obtains:
Due to the complication of J B , we provide a sufficient condition. By substituting N>0 into J B , we find that J B is negative definite. Hence to ensure the existence of a market-sharing equilibrium, the sufficient condition is:
The equilibrium prices are: 
where F=−9+2α 2 1 −3α2+6α1α2+4α 2 2 +D>0.
Proof of Assumption:
With the assumption of 0<α1<1 and 0<α2<1, we first examine the signs of the prices. In regime 1, p1=1−α1>0 and p2=1−α2>0; In regime 2, p1=2−α1−α2>0 and γ2=2(1−α2)>0; In regime 3, all the prices are proved to be positive. Now we examine whether this assumption is sufficient for a market-sharing equilibrium. Inequalities (A-2), (A-5) and (A-8) are reduced to: 1−α1α2>0, 1−α1α2+2α2(1−α2)>0, and I=2(1−α1α2)+α2γ B 2 > 2(1−α1α2)>0. 
B: Proof of Proposition 1
C: Proof of Lemma 2
Substituting the equilibrium prices and market shares into expressions (3) yields:
From expressions (A-10), E<0, F>0, and the constraints that 0<α1<1 and 0<α2<1, we have: 
